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Bits of Power: 
Struggling for Control of Information and Communication Networks 
 
Abstract 
 
Contests for the control of information and communication networks and, specifically, 
control of digital bits of power (the capacity to control information processing) in the 
current period often take the form of struggles over network neutrality. This paper 
examines how, historically, such struggles have been accompanied by changes in the 
configuration of ideas or social imaginaries that have legitimized the actions of 
companies, the state and civil society in relation to the development of networks. The 
aim is to assess the likelihood that institutional arrangements will be put in place that 
might privilege citizen interests in preserving an open internet and strengthen the 
capacity of citizens to resist power asymmetries that threaten their fundamental rights 
to privacy, access to information, and freedom of expression in the digital environment. 
Concepts derived from historical institutionalism and the economic history of technical 
change provide a framework for examining continuity and change starting from the 
introduction of digital technologies. The analysis shows why a narrow policy focus on 
network neutrality can obscure the way citizen interests in the digitally mediated 
environment are subordinated to corporate and state interests, making it difficult to 
assess whether the current period is path dependent and locked in to a single direction 
for development or whether there is the potential for alternative pathways - a ‘forking 
of the road’ - which could be more favourable to citizens. 
 
Keywords:  Algorithms, History of Networks, Information Processing, Internet 
Governance, Network Neutrality, Path Dependence  
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Bits of Power: 
Struggling for Control of Information and Communication Networks 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper examines struggles over the preservation of an open internet in the light of 
historical contests for the control of information and communication networks. The aim 
is to assess the likelihood that institutional arrangements will be put in place that might 
privilege citizen interests, enhancing their capacity to resist power asymmetries so that 
their fundamental rights to privacy, access to information, and freedom of expression 
are more likely to be upheld as digital information processing capabilities continue to 
develop (UNESCO, 2015). When the National Research Council in the United States 
released its Bits of Power (NRC, 1997) report, it was concerned with the challenges of 
maintaining an open environment for the collection, processing and circulation of 
scientific data. This report was precient in highlighting how technology, including the 
internet, might come to influence public access to data and how the marketisation of 
data was resulting in new inequalities due to ‘the exponential accumulation of these 
electronic data – these bits of power’ (NRC, 1997: 19). The phrase - bits of power – is a 
reminder of the significance of power relations in the changing technological and 
institutional environment in which information is produced, circulated and applied.  
 
With the internet providing a principal means for processing and circulating 
information in contemporary society, struggles over ‘bits of power’ are coming into 
particularly stark relief. Some of these struggles concern the governance or stewardship 
of the internet’s domain name system, for instance, while others involve efforts to 
preserve network neutrality or what is often loosely described as an open internet. 1 
This paper examines periods in which struggles over information and communication 
networks have resulted in shifts in the control of digital bits of power (the capacity to 
control information processing), accompanied by changes in the configuration of ideas 
which influence and legitimize the actions of companies, the state and civil society in 
relation to the development of these networks. I suggest in this paper that a policy focus 
on network neutrality tends to obscure the way citizen interests have been 
subordinated to corporate and state interests historically and that this makes it difficult 
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to assess the potential for the emergence of a digitally mediated environment that might 
be controlled in a way that renders it more consistent with citizens’ interests.  
 
The next section explains the rationale for an historical consideration of changes in the 
configurations of control over bits of power. It situates the discussion in the broader 
context of the capitalist system and it explains why my focus on information processing 
within the information and communication network subsystem is justified. Section 
three presents a summary of social imaginaries or sets of ideas which combine in 
various ways through time to legitimize the actions of the state, companies and civil 
society as electronic networks have developed. The discussion in this paper is informed 
by concepts derived from historical institutionalism and the economic history of 
technical change (section four). These concepts provide a framework for considering 
continuity and change in the control of networked information processing and for 
examining some of the outcomes and consequences. The way prominent social 
imaginaries have combined with the development of information and communication 
networks during several historical periods is examined in the fifth section. The 
conclusion assesses whether the current period is likely to give rise to an information 
processing control structure with greater scope for citizen resistance to developments 
in the network environment that subordinate their fundamental rights.  
 
2. Information Control Systems in Historical Perspective 
 
Beniger (1986: vi) observed that ‘history alone cannot explain why it is information that 
increasingly plays the crucial role in economy and society’. He suggested that changes in 
information processing technologies and in the institutional arrangements for 
governing society’s control systems are crucial determinants of crises and their 
outcomes. Information and communication networks are increasingly complex and 
powerful digital platform operators have emerged which are orchestrating the market 
to offer services that address nearly all of the endeavors of citizens who have affordable 
access to the internet (Mansell, 2015; Hölck, 2016). These networks are a crucial 
component of 21st century societal control systems and there are multiple anxieties 
about an imminent crisis of societal control over bits of power. Two instances of such 
anxieties are the erosion of individual privacy and risks to citizen safety under 
‘surveillance capitalism’ and the production and circulation of ‘fake news’ and its impact 
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on freedom of expression and the democratic process under what Zuboff (2015) refers 
to as ‘surveillance capitalism’. Struggles over bits of power are a constant feature in the 
evolution of networks that support global information flows and information 
processing, but today there is ambiguity about whether the internet’s architecture is - 
or can be - helpful in averting conditions that subordinate citizens’ interests.  
 
The discussion in this paper is motivated by a question that is central to research in the 
political economy of media and communication field - ‘what kind of world will be borne 
through the midwifery of our new and more powerful communications tools?’ (Smythe, 
1950: 51). When the internet emerged from the Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 
project supported by the Department of Defense in the United States, the aim was to 
develop a resilient network for information flows using a set of protocols for 
communication over a packet-switched network. The applications that would use the 
network were not a central concern of the developers. Work started on the technical 
standards in the 1960s and, by the 1990s, what came to be known as the Internet 
Protocol Suite had succeeded in marginalizing other contending standards for the 
information and communication network and it helped to enable digital communication 
flows to expand very rapidly. The Internet Engineering Task Force (established in 1986) 
and the Internet Society (established in 1992) developed the standards for the internet 
architectural model. These standards called for a horizontal end-to-end layer in the 
middle of a layered network architecture. These protocols (including the Transport 
Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP)) enabled information flows to be 
controlled in a highly decentralized manner from the edges of the network so that data 
could be sent and received without interference (Besen, 2016). 2 The private sector 
became involved in the provision of this new network of networks, subject to the 
oversight of institutions charged with the governance of the internet.  
 
The introduction of the end-to-end feature of the internet’s layered model has 
sometimes been regarded as a stable architecture, consistent with protecting the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, reflecting the collaborative culture of the 
computer scientists who participated in the early years of the internet’s development 
(Abbate, 2000; Flichy, 2007). In this view, irreversable technical choices were made 
early on that set the internet on a stable pathway where the network’s application 
blindness in the middle layers of its architecture was expected to help to avert a highly 
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concentrated digital information and communication industry. The hope was that 
dominant companies would not be able to exert control over information flows and 
information processing in ways that would disadvantage, initially, scientists, and later, 
citizens (Garcia, 2016). The fact that the standards for the internet are not stable and 
that departures from the internet’s initial architecture have consequences for the public 
interest has been recognized for some time. As David (2001: 160) observes referring to 
the internet, ‘the piecemeal introduction of new technical mechanisms in the core of the 
network will soon begin the destruction of those performance capabilities which have 
hitherto constituted some of the Internet’s most beneficial public-goods properties’. 
 
Reality would prove to be much more complex than the initial hopeful expectations of 
the internet’s early developers. As van Schewick (2016: 3030; 2010) says, ‘over the past 
two decades, the Internet’s architecture has become more opaque and more 
controllable’. Network operators have been able to control many features of the 
internet, notwithstanding the end-to-end principle. These operators, together with 
Over-the-Top service providers such as Facebook, have developed business models 
enabling them to generate profits by treating internet users as a resource of 
economically valuable data (Ballon, 2014). Disputes about network neutrality (the end-
to-end principle) typically frame policy debate around whether the internet’s 
architecture should be preserved to protect the public interest,3 often without 
considering how control over bits of power has been changing over time or the 
implications of those changes for citizens.  
 
An historical perspective is helpful because it encourages ‘thinking in time’ (David, 
2007). If choices with respect to the technical and institutional arrangements for the 
control of bits of power have been locked in to a single path – if they have been path 
dependent - this could mean that the exploitation of citizen interests as a result of 
corporate and state control over the processing of information is inevitable. 
Alternatively, if these choices are not locked in, at least not at the level of the 
information and communication subsystem, there may be the potential for alternative 
pathways to emerge which could be more favourable to citizens. In the contemporary 
period, van Schewick (2016: 287) argues in relation to the internet that, ‘moving from 
an end-to-end architecture to a core-centered architecture gradually reduces the 
number of potential innovators and changes the environment for application-level 
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innovation from decentralized to centralized’. These kinds of centralizing tendencies 
(e.g. modifications optimizing specific applications and functions in the network such as 
asymmetric bandwidth for uploading and downloading or firewalls) have consequences 
for the way companies, states and citizens can exercise their control over bits of power.  
 
In the political economy of media and communication tradition it is often argued that 
research should focus on neoliberal capitalism as a mode of accumulation which, absent 
a crisis of the capitalist system itself, leaves little scope for protecting citizen interests 
(Fuchs, 2012). Framed in this way, technological innovations that occur through time in 
the media and communications sphere are associated with power relations that 
privilege the interests of the owners of production, especially through the control they 
exert over information (Innis, 1950; Babe, 2015). Although historians of the capitalist 
system have argued that asymmetrical structural power has reproduced itself and 
shown that ‘the long run always wins in the end’ (Braudel, 1966/1973: 1244), it has 
also been shown that, within the media and communication subsystem, there has been 
no ‘necessary coincidence’ between the interests of the owners of capital, the regulatory 
institutions of the state, the state’s military/security apparatus, and outcomes for 
citizens (Garnham, 1986). Even if citizen interests are subordinated under neoliberal 
capitalism, it seems likely that technologies of control and institutionalized power 
relations which rest on deeply held beliefs or social imaginaries will condition 
outcomes, sometimes in surprising ways (Taylor, 2004).  
  
3. Imaginaries in Network History 
 
In his work on the political economy of capitalism and communication, Garnham (1990: 
5) argued that it is important to examine asymmetries of power in relation to 
communication and, especially, in the ‘the relation between capitalism as a social 
system and the set of ideas about the world possessed by human agents’. A set of ideas, 
or a social imaginary, as Taylor (2004) suggests, is the ‘deeper normative notions and 
images’ or common expectations that are held in society about how collective practice 
is, or should be, organized. Efforts to control bits of power, including the exchange and 
processing of information, are therefore informed by such deeper notions. Various 
contending imaginaries, over time, will underpin what comes to be seen as legitimate 
action on the part of corporate, state and civil society actors (Mansell, 2012). Taylor 
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makes no a priori claims about which particular social imaginary or set of ideas should 
be most prominent in a democratic order where citizen rights are respected, but he 
insists that different sets of ideas will compete for primacy over time. Social imaginaries 
are abstractions from the messy reality of the everyday experience and practices of 
individuals and, in this respect, the following should be read as a simplified account of 
several ideals which inform imaginaries about social ordering in Western societies. 
 
Free and Unfettered Markets  
The first set of ideas is that markets are, or should be, free of interference by external 
authorities. For example, market analysts often insist that networks are central to 
economic prosperity, that they thrive in unregulated markets, and that this gives rise to 
innovation and prosperity. The narrative is that growth in the quantity of (digital) 
information and advances in information processing capabilities fuels economic growth 
in the knowledge economy (David & Foray, 2003). Thus, the network infrastructure – 
today, the internet - is expected to develop optimally in an unfettered marketplace. 
Unhindered markets are said to foster the growth of the digital platforms operated by 
Twitter, Google, Facebook, Amazon and others. A marketplace, free from regulation by 
the state, should maximize social welfare and companies should be given responsibility 
as the custodians of bits of power. This narrative is often presented by adherents to this 
social imaginary as the justification for corporate self-regulation.  
 
It may be claimed in this narrative, for example, that the key to prosperity is knowledge 
discovery from data assets which should be valued solely in economic terms (Sun & 
Han, 2012). The assets of interest are the bits of power that mediate company-customer 
relationships and support the advertising industry in ‘guiding one of history’s most 
massive stealth efforts in social profiling’ as Turow (2011: 1) pointedly characterizes it. 
The aim is to generate economic value from data (such as the data generated by humans 
and by the Internet of Things). The fact that these data assets are also used to identify 
individuals ‘of interest’ for commerce and for the ‘war’ on terror (Kuehn, 2013; Guzik, 
2009) is overlooked in this narrative. The responsibility for market outcomes in the 
contemporary period is imagined to be appropriately delegated to algorithms (Napoli, 
2014) and to the ‘free’ marketplace. It is the market’s own dynamics which are expected 
to protect the interests of consumers (and citizens).  
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Public Interest State Intervention  
A second set of ideas is that the state - through its regulatory apparatus and through its 
military and policing institutions (hereafter referred to as the regulatory state and the 
military state) - is expected to intervene in the market to enhance or protect citizen 
welfare. In this narrative, markets are not regarded as ‘free’; instead, they give rise to 
changing configurations of asymmetrical power among mainly corporate actors whose 
monopolization strategies risk treating citizens (and consumers) inequitably. In this 
narrative, it is legitimate for a state to intervene in the market to foster market 
efficiency and, thereby, to secure the public interest by owning or regulating the means 
for the production and the distribution of goods and services. In relation to information 
and communication networks, this becomes a narrative about the legitimacy of the state 
to uphold the principle of ‘common’ or ‘public’ carriage to ensure the unhindered flow 
of information (Noam, 1994). It has underpinned policy measures to uphold citizen 
rights to access information, the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy 
protection. In relation to the internet, the narrative is that companies should be obliged 
to treat data neutrally in line with the end-to-end principle of the internet (van der 
Sloot, 2014). Citizen rights can, however, be abridged when required (Berger, 2009), for 
instance, to tackle crime such as drug trafficking, digital content copyright infringement 
or terrorism. Processing bits of power becomes a means of control ‘in the 
institutionalized production of security’ (Mueller, 2014: np). In this set of ideas, the 
military state is justified in subordinating the principles of individual privacy and 
freedom of expression to the goal of collective security and the regulatory state must 
balance the citizen’s rights with those of private companies. 
 
Civil Society Generative Power  
The narrative underpinning the third social imaginary in the contemporary period is 
that citizens, including members of technical communities, who comprise civil society, 
should have a major role in shaping outcomes in democratic societies through their 
passive or active resistance to actions of corporate and state actors when they result in 
injustice and inequity. With respect to networks, non-market collaborative participation 
within digital spaces enabled by the internet and the good will of technical communities 
are the best ways to secure citizen interests. This may be supported by 
multistakeholder deliberation or it may occur as a result of citizen uprisings or other 
contributions by citizens (Mansell, 2013; McChesney, 2013). The former is seen as a 
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democratic way to institutionalize authority and accountability (DeNardis & Raymond, 
2013; DeNardis and Musiani, 2016; Hofmann et al., 2016; Mueller, 2010). In relation to 
internet governance, for example, network neutrality advocates focus on preserving the 
end-to-end principal to ensure that discrimination does not occur and the design of 
software code and hardware is positioned as a protector of citizen interests. The 
activities of decentralized online communities are valued as a means of protecting the 
public interest even if they rely on commercial platforms or open software and 
anonymous networks (Gehl, 2014). The imaginary is that internet users can control 
their information at least sufficiently to defend their rights in the face of incursions by 
commercial or state actors (Wauters et al., 2014).  
 
In summary, if the power apparatus ‘is the sum of the political, social, economic and 
cultural hierarchies’ (Braudel, 1979/1982: 555), these sets of ideas or social 
imaginaries will combine in varying ways through time to underpin struggles for the 
control of bits of power. The first set of ideas emphasizes choice in a ‘free’ market to 
achieve consumer and citizen welfare; the second positions the state with the authority, 
through regulatory institutions, to intervene in the commercial market to protect 
citizens, or to act through legislation, in the case of the police powers; and the third 
turns to the citizen (or the technology innovator), empowered through collective 
initiative, to legitimize action to protect the citizen. In practice, of course, institutional 
actors will have different accountabilities and modes of operating and, at the 
institutional level of analysis it is not possible to examine how individual cognitive and 
other factors play out (Scott, 2014). Concepts drawn from the historical study of 
institutions and the economic history of technological change are discussed next to 
prepare the ground for examining the dynamic relationships between these ideas or 
social imaginaries and technological change in the digital environment.  
 
4. Critical Junctions and Path Dependence in Network History  
 
When the analytical focus is moved away from the narrow debate around network 
neutrality to the actions of companies, states and citizens in relation to control over 
networked information processing, the historical institutionalism tradition helps to 
focus attention on events that have yielded stability or instability in the network 
development process. This tradition is sometimes criticized for its overemphasis on 
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continuity at the expense of change, but recent work highlights instability and a concern 
with the dynamics of change (Bannerman & Haggart, 2014). Braudel’s analysis of the 
history of control systems is pertinent in this context because of his interest in control 
systems that conditioned the transformation of the networks over time; in his case, in 
relation to civilizations (and capitalism). As a world systems theorist, Braudel 
distinguished between ‘the world economy (the whole system)’ and ‘a world-economy’, 
the latter referring to ‘a fragment of the world’ (Braudel, 1979/1984: 22). In this paper, 
the focus is on the information and communication system as one such ‘fragment’. He 
argued that, even in the face of the industrial revolution, ‘capitalism remained 
essentially true to itself’, but also that ‘sometimes too there are major breaks with the 
past’ (Braudel, 1979/1984: 621). Crises of control over material assets could ‘mark the 
beginning of a process of destructuration’ (Braudel, 1979/1984: 85). When he focused 
on the world system, he said that no society ‘has ever developed horizontally, on a plane 
of complete equality’ (1979/1982: 463), acknowledging that a plurality of societal 
structures and institutional arrangements ‘is an essential factor both of movement and 
of resistance to movement’ (Braudel, 1979/1982: 465-466), an observation that 
resonates with Taylor’s (2004) account of contending social imaginaries that change, 
albeit slowly, through time.  
 
Braudel’s (1987/1993: 26) historical method involved the examination of selected 
‘turning points’ when processes yielding the centralization and concentration of power 
were destabilized (Braudel, 1979/1984). Over the longue durée, he found that trading 
or exchange outcomes were influenced by network interactions and by monopolization 
strategies which were aimed at controlling material assets, to the disadvantage of 
certain actors. Thus, he said that ‘the division of labour on a world-economy scale 
cannot be described as a concerted agreement made between equal parties and always 
open to review. It became established progressively as a chain of subordinations, each 
conditioning the other’ (emphasis added) (Braudel, 1979/1984: 48). This suggests that 
successive chains of subordination among unequal parties will result in choices about 
the control of the information and communication system. Have such choices 
irreversibly locked the system onto a path that inevitably subordinates citizen 
interests?  
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Braudel (1979/1982: 416, 433) also observed that tendencies towards the 
centralization of power have been conditioned by what he referred to as ‘minimum 
qualifications’ or ‘essential characteristics’. These favoured ‘profitable circuits of 
power’, especially by influencing the circulation of information. When monopolistic 
power emerged as ‘the product of power, cunning and intelligence’ (Braudel, 
1979/1982: 418), it was seen as the result of a dynamic process. For Braudel 
(1987/1993: xxxviii, xl ), historical explanations work on ‘different varieties of time’, 
some rapid and some slow. The aim of analysis, he observed, should be to determine 
whether conjunctures of events have a substantial effect ‘on relations, to favor or 
militate against collective bonds, tightening some, straining and breaking others’ 
(Braudel, 1980: 75).  
 
Hope (2016: 16) points out that Braudel privileged enduring patterns over 
‘conventional periodizations and event-centred chronicles of history in the making’ in 
contrast to Gurvitch’s (1964) historical method which emphasized discontinuities. 
However, since Braudel did give some attention to ‘conjunctural rhythms’ which he said 
were synchronic (Braudel, 1979/1984), it seems reasonable to consider how continuity 
and discontinuity in technologies and institutions have altered power relations at 
specific moments of network development. Braudel also saw that actions around 
technology were neither linear (Braudel, 1979/1981: 334), nor simply the result of the 
‘internal development of technology or science’ (Braudel, 1979/1981: 335). Specific 
chains of subordination of various interests relating to network developments were 
found to be associated with particular moments in time (Braudel, 1980). 
Methodologically, Braudel (1979/1982: 459) acknowledged that ‘for practical purposes 
of course, this totality has to be split up into smaller sets for convenience of 
observation’. He cited Schumpeter’s (1954: 3) comment that ‘out of its great stream 
with his classifying hand the investigator artificially extracts the economic facts’. As far 
as the appropriate length of time is concerned, Braudel (1980: 45) emphasized that this 
is fundamental. He clearly preferred the longue durée, but building on this tradition, 
Collier and Collier (1991) suggest that the length of time of critical junctures in history 
can be a matter of choice, notwithstanding the fact that the selected periodization will 
condition what an analysis reveals.  
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In the historical institutionalism tradition there is controversy about whether choices 
taken around conjectural events are the path dependent outcome of antecedent 
conditions. Collier and Collier (1991: 29) suggest that for a set of events to ‘count’ as a 
critical juncture in the sense that it yields a path dependent outcome, it must occur in 
similar ways in different instances and it must produce a legacy as a result of its ‘core 
attributes’ – here considered to be the minimum characteristics which enable control of 
network development. In the political science branch of historical institutionalism, the 
notion of ‘path dependency’ at critical junctures is regarded as a static theory which is 
not concerned with change, conflict or the agency of social actors (Peters et al., 2005: 
1283). This view differs, however, from the concept of path dependent system dynamics 
developed in the literature on the economic history of technological change. For David 
(2007), for instance, path dependence is a concept, not a theory. It refers to dynamic 
developmental processes shaped by the contingencies of their own history, but not in a 
deterministic way. This version of the concept was developed in response to static 
economic analysis to acknowledge that a dynamic process may be ‘governed by its own 
history’, not that it is always governed in this way (David, 2007: 92). A path dependent 
critical juncture is a ‘forking of the road’ when ‘there was an open path which would 
have led to events quite different from those that eventually transpire’ (David, 2007: 
95). Additionally, the study of path dependent processes is concerned with agency. One 
of the aims of research is to ‘identify and elucidate the role of critical human actions (or 
failures to act)’ as the ‘drama’ unfolds (David, 2007: 95).  
 
The large drama is the capitalist world system which was Braudel’s primary focus. 
However, the aim here is to examine whether certain ‘critical bifurcations’ at the 
subsystem level - the information and communication network - resulted in irreversible 
outcomes. Even if monopolization (centralization) is a likely outcome of the chain of 
subordination around a minimum characteristic, there may be opportunities for a new 
pathway to emerge since it is well established that there have been continuities and 
instabilities in the wake of technological innovation in the digital sphere (Freeman & 
Louça, 2001). In the political economy of media and communication field, for example, 
Pickard (2014) has examined critical junctures in the history of the press and 
broadcasting industries demonstrating that a set of ideas upholding social democratic 
values was present in the United States in the post war period. These did not influence 
the path of the development of the media system and the public interest in a diverse and 
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pluralistic media market was not protected during the critical juncture he explores. He 
considers whether the contemporary period might yield a different outcome, 
notwithstanding the antecedent choices. In the following, shifts in power in the control 
of the information and communication network’s information processing capabilities 
are examined at several critical junctures. The focus is on relatively short periods 
beginning around the time that technological innovation gave rise to the capability for 
digital communication. These periods are contextualized by a brief discussion of the 
pre-1960 period. The analysis provides a basis for assessing whether the contemporary 
period should ‘count’ as a path dependent critical juncture. Even if asymmetrical power 
relationships are entrenched for long periods and system dynamics are dominated by 
the profit motivations and security interests of the state, what is the evidence for a 
potential ‘forking of the road’?  
 
5. Critical Junctures and Information Processing Control  
 
Until the late 1950s, technologically mediated information and communication 
networks were influenced by the control exercised by state owned institutions over the 
standards for communication using the analogue circuit, the minimum characteristic 
that enabled information to flow on a non-discriminatory basis through the telegraph 
(from the early 1800s) and, later, the circuit switched telephone network (from the 
1880s). Regulatory control over flows of information came to be centralized in the 
hands of the state even through it was the private sector that financed investment in 
network equipment and initially operated networks (and continued to do so in the 
United States and parts of Canada). Some forms of control resided with the private 
sector but the state had a legitimate role in intervening in the market in a bid to protect 
the public interest. Although standards for electronic signaling and the network designs 
were initiated by the private sector through technological inventions and subsequent 
investment, the global spread of the early networks soon led to the formation of state-
led arrangements for the governance of networks (Winseck & Pike, 2007).  It would be 
nation states, for example, that would provide the necessary approvals for companies to 
construct facilities and operate in their territories (Raboy, 2016). From the 1850s, 
states sought to exercise control over information and communication networks 
through their membership of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and its 
intergovernmental oversight of the technical specifications and standards for 
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electromechanical technologies, wireless telegraphy and the telephone network. Much 
later, the ITU would admit corporate representatives to its deliberations on network 
regulation, and standardization activities would be led by private sector consortia as the 
first set of ideas became more prominent in the 1980s and market-led competition 
emerged as the preferred set of ideas about the best way to secure the interests of 
citizens (Hanson & Melody, 1989).  
 
In the early period, however, the state or regulated companies were credited with the 
legitimate authority to build and operate public communication networks and to 
manage the flows of information in line with mandates aimed at preserving the public 
interest in transborder information flows and in the privacy of individuals. The military 
state’s role also was deemed to be legitimate. Security and law enforcement provisions 
were introduced whereby states reserved ‘the right to stop, in accordance with their 
national law, the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to 
the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency’ (ITU, 
1865/2002: ch VI, art 34; Rutkowski, 2010, 2011) and network operators were obliged 
to ‘communicate such correspondence to the competent authorities’ (ITU, 1865/2002: 
ch VI, art 37). The state in Western democracies was presumed to have a legitimate 
right to intervene in the telecommunication service market. The services to be 
regulated were designated in the United States as ‘the offering of telecommunications 
for a fee directly to the public’ (US Congress, 1996: 47 Code § 153(53)) and, later in 
Europe, as services offered by a ‘provider of electronic communications to the public’ 
(European Commission, 2015), both definitions aimed at ensuring that information 
could flow unhindered through the network (Aronson & Cowhey, 1988; Noam, 1987). 
Retaining control over the standards for signaling for the telegraph network, and later, 
for the telephone network, meant that these technologies served as the minimum 
characteristic for control of the system. The regulatory state promoted the process of 
extending network access to citizens, although citizen interests were not always the 
most prominent. This was so, for instance, when the military state took the view that 
their rights to privacy could be abrogated to protect public safety. For this extended 
period, the choices made for the technical design and operational management of 
information and communication networks were relatively stable. In retrospect, were 
the choices in this early period responsible for creating path dependent outcomes? As a 
consideration of periods (1960s-1970s; mid 1980s- early 1990s; mid 1990s-early 
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2000s) which seem to ‘count’ as critical junctures in the history of information and 
communication networks illustrates, there were fluctuations in the prominence of the 
three sets of ideas outlined above and changes in the minimum condition for the control 
over information processing.  
 
Three Critical Junctures 
 
1960s and 1970s  
In the 1960s and 70s, the first set of ideas – Free and Unfettered Markets – started to 
increase in salience and the relevant minimum characteristic required for control over 
information processing also started to change. With innovations in electronic switching 
technologies, building on the invention and standardization of packet switching which 
provided for a less vulnerable command and control system than was feasible with the 
older circuit switching system (Baron, 1960), the relations of power in the commercial 
market began to change. The monopoly network operator, AT&T, started to face 
competition in the United States when the privately owned, MCI, founded in 1963, and 
several other private companies started providing point-to-point communication 
services to connect computing facilities. Information processing companies such as 
GEISCO, IBM and Tymshare began developing the market for timeshare data processing 
at the edges of networks and global trade in electronic data processing services started 
to become a reality (Melody, 1972). The public network operators began to lose their 
exclusive control over the attachment of terminal or ‘edge’ equipment to their 
networks, e.g. private automated branch exchanges and computers, and, for a time, 
transmission standards, now packet switching, remained the minimum characteristic 
needed to build market share in growing trade in services market.  
 
The new entrant network operators would soon be liberated by the regulator and the 
courts to provide switched telecommunication services offered to the public (Melody, 
1970; Temin, 1987). The public network operators had relatively little information 
processing capability at the core of their networks, apart from that required to operate 
their networks and to provide customer billing. In a bid to defend its monopoly, the 
incumbent network operator in the United States retaliated against the information 
processing companies by offering discount pricing for large businesses that required 
their capacity for the transmission of increasing volumes of data. The companies 
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providing information processing services were not regulated in the United States 
because the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had designated them as 
computerized information processing services with no obligation to be neutral in their 
treatment of information (Lentz, 2011). In Europe, the historic post, telegraph and 
telephone organizations remained relatively unchallenged because during this period 
the regulatory state did not seek to separate communication from information 
processing services to accommodate the interests of information processing companies, 
most of which were offering data services from their base in the United States.  
 
Albeit through different market structures, the regulatory state in the United States and 
in Europe had little traction over the information processing services operating at the 
periphery of the public communication network. There would be ambiguities about 
what was, and was not, an information processing service but, during most of this 
period, the regulatory state focused primarily on promoting universal access to public 
telecommunication (telephony) networks (Noam, 1987). Thus, while the narrative 
underpinning the legitimacy of the regulatory state’s intervention in the market was 
still relatively prominent with regard to voice services, it had little control of the 
development of the data market. The military state became increasingly interested in 
the use of innovations in computing equipment and data processing for mass electronic 
surveillance (CPCLCR, 1972; Goos et al., 2015).4 Privacy protection issues began to come 
to fore in policy debates, but citizen interests in such protections were largely 
subordinated to the interests of the companies that were driving the expansion of global 
data markets. The minimum characteristic for controlling bits of power by the end of 
the period had started to shift from the packet switching capabilities in the core of 
public telecommunication networks to the ever more powerful ‘edge’ capabilities of 
companies for processing information based on advances in computing.  
 
Mid 1980s to early 1990s  
The period from the mid-1980s to the early 90s continued to see the ascendency of the 
free and unfettered market narrative as public network operators attempted to reassert 
their position in the information marketplace. Their strategy was to invest in the new 
minimum characteristic for control - computerized data processing capability in the 
core of their networks - to compete with the providers of ‘edge’ services. A new network 
design, the Integrated Services Digital Network, relied on the expertise of computer 
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scientists and telecommunication engineers, who initially designed a relatively 
decentralized network structure (Mansell, 1993). In the complex chain of 
subordination, however, when the public network operators implemented the 
information processing capability at the core of the network, they redesigned it to 
enable centralized control of new premium information services including freephone, 
caller identification, telemarketing as well as customized pricing packages. These 
companies needed to deploy this information processing capability because, as they 
largely succeeded in arguing at the time, control was necessary to protect individual 
privacy and to secure the safety of the network in the public interest. At the same time, 
there was a gradual reduction of interventions by the regulatory state after the break up 
of the AT&T monopoly in the United States. This set in train initiatives to stimulate a 
competitive marketplace in the United States and then in Europe, and indeed, globally 
(Temin, 1987; Thatcher, 1995; Mansell, 1995). The regulatory state’s intervention in the 
United States would be focused mainly on addressing market failures as markets began 
a process of re-consolidation (Melody, 1990; Temin & Galambos, 1987) and, in Europe, 
the process of privatising the network operators and introducing competition, initially 
in the United Kingdom and then across Europe, got underway, with somewhat greater 
attention to the social consequences of the push to introduce competition (EC, 1996; 
OECD, 1993).  
 
At the same time, the chain of subordination which led to the choice to locate 
sophisticated information processing capability at the core of the public network 
enabled the network operators to start developing strategies to capture or lock their 
customers into their information-related services (Mansell, 1988; Samarajiva, 1996). 
This can be seen as a critical juncture in the sense that the personalization of customer 
generated information (data) started to enable these operators to engage in profit 
maximization based on the ‘intelligent’ functionality that was under their control. 
Privacy protection and security guidelines made an appearance internationally in policy 
in a visible way at this time as the regulatory state started to respond to public interest 
concerns about the companies’ use of sensitive customer data (OECD, 1981, 1992).5 
These concerns about automated processing of digital information would later be 
echoed in responses to algorithmic data processing.  
 
In this period, the first (Free and Unfettered Markets) and the second (Public Interest 
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State Intervention) sets of ideas blended with the regulatory state emphasizing citizen 
interests in accessing a ubiquitous public network, but giving relatively little attention 
to the implications of the network operators’ control over information processing. The 
prevailing narrative was that computerized information processing was essentially an 
innovative ‘edge’ activity that would drive economic growth in the knowledge economy 
(Foray, 2002), boosted by unfettered market-led growth. Academic researchers argued 
at this time that the citizens’ interests in diverse sources of information and in 
controlling their own data were being jeopardized, but their calls for more pro-active 
regulation had little impact on the investment strategies aimed at generating revenues 
based on the processing of customer data. The race was on to establish services that 
could be marketed to customers as being beneficial in enabling them to enjoy greater 
diversity and choice in a competitive marketplace (Melody & Paltridge, 1992; Noam, 
1987). The military state’s interest in harvesting data and monitoring networks did not 
have a prominent profile in the public policy narrative during this period, but it was 
nascent in the public network operators’ claims that technical harm could result from 
the move towards decentralized control of information and communication networks.  
 
In parallel with the developments described so far, and with little coordination with the 
‘edge’ service providers or the public network operators, the military state was funding 
research that would give rise to the TCP/IP standards for connecting host computers to 
the internet and favouring a decentralized network architecture with information 
processing occurring at the edges (Flichy, 2007; Leiner et al., 1998).6 With information 
processing control now firmly established as the minimum characteristic required for 
success in the marketplace and with the transmission of digital bits becoming a 
commodity service for the public network operators despite their introduction of 
‘intelligent’ software at the core of their networks, the question was whether their 
technical standards and network architecture would secure their dominance as a result 
of earlier path dependent choices. Their status as providers of communication services 
‘intended for the public’ meant that their capacity to process data was restricted by the 
regulatory state, largely to routine network management functions. Around this time, 
however, a conjectural event would change the dynamics of network development. This 
‘event’ was the ascendency of the third set of ideas (Civil Society Generative Power), 
partly mobilized by the earlier choices that had located information processing power 
at the edge of networks.  
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Mid 1990s to early 2000s 
As the internet’s architecture and standards for an infrastructure of routers, servers and 
connected information processing devices spread  (GAO, 2016), when the internet was 
opened up for public and commercial use in the early 1990s, data packets could be 
routed through networks without the centralized control of the public network 
operators. Their investments were at even greater risk than in the earlier period of 
becoming legacy technologies as Over-the-Top service providers started developing 
more sophisticated data services (McKnight, 2014). There were competing network 
architectures and standards which were more centralized,7 but the Internet Protocol 
Suite – the end-to-end function in the middle layer – meant that edge computing 
services would flourish.  
 
The decentralized architectural model meant that ‘edge’ service providers could 
transport their data with the incumbent network operators providing the transmission 
capacity as Internet Access Providers. One narrative was that the new service providers 
were ‘free riding’ on the investments of the public network operators. The new services 
would include search engines, video sites, film streaming, webhosting services, blogging 
platforms, social media sites, and online retailing and payment services, among others. 
Advocacy of the virtues of free and unfettered markets became more vociferous and the 
regulatory state declined to intervene in the market for information services. The public 
network operators’ centralized network design was superseded by a decentralized 
network design. As what would later come to be known as ‘digital platforms’ started to 
emerge, the military state, which had relied historically on the public networks for 
electronic surveillance, now began to claim that new legislation was needed to ensure 
its access to online users’ data flows and, sometimes, content.  
 
Some seemed to regard the internet’s end-to-end principle as the minimum condition 
for control, but, in fact, it was the edge information processing technology which 
continued to serve as a minimum characteristic for control in the marketplace. 
However, it was the neutrality of the middle layers of the internet that would provide an 
opportunity for civil society to lay claim to information processing power, consistent 
with the growing prominence of the third set of ideas (Generative Power of Civil 
Society). Multistakeholder institutions, intended at least ideally to give voice to civil 
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society concerns as well as to the state and the private sector, started to be seen as an 
effective means of governing the internet. This idea began to spread beyond the 
community of the originators of internet’s standards, albeit with a variety of modalities 
of decision making. 8 The ideal associated with this social imaginary was that 
collaboration and dispersed initiative, largely working from the bottom up and with an 
emphasis on inclusion, equity and accountable participation (Backstrand, 2006), is 
superior in supporting citizens in responding to interventions by the state or resisting 
the ‘free’ market when they jeopardize their interests. As Franklin (2013: 183) put it, 
‘like Rip Van Winkle, government regulators have discovered that things have changed 
and they no longer call the shots in terms of internet design, access, and use’. These 
developments did not necessarily imply the subordination of corporate interests 
however, and Sarikakis (2012: 151) argues that multistakeholder governance typically 
grants ‘private interests legitimacy in public policymaking next to elected governments’. 
In the Western countries, there would be multiple struggles among state, company and 
civil society representatives for the control of the internet. In some instances, 
companies regarded multistakeholder institutions as benign and, in other instances, as 
‘inherently dangerous’ (Gleckman, 2016: 94). Until the early 2000s in the Western 
world, there seemed to be a consensus that the internet’s end-to-end design principle, 
along with the functional standards associated with the Internet and Transport layers of 
the network architecture, were helping to diffuse asymmetrical power relationships, 
notwithstanding the power of companies with control of the minimum condition – 
information processing power – that were developing services at the edges using the 
applications layer of the internet.  
 
During this period there was a coincidence of the first and the third set of ideas as 
enablers of legitimate action and this would generate conflict in the future. This 
combination would fall short of protecting the public interest, notwithstanding the 
growing prominence of values consistent with the generative power of civil society 
ideal. In the United States, the set of ideas giving legitimacy to state regulatory 
intervention to diffuse the unfair exercise of monopolistic market power receded. There 
was little use of anti-trust legislation to restrain the monopolistic digital platform 
operators as they pursued strategies aimed at exploiting network economies of scale 
and scope and devised business models to process their customers’ data. In Europe, the 
regulatory state focused on promoting competition in the digital economy with few 
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effective tools to respond to the growing dominance of companies such as Microsoft and 
Google (apart from competition proceedings, the outcomes of which did little to reduce 
their market power). Markets consolidated and the digital platform operators engaged 
in an intense battle over whether they, or the traditional network operators, would 
succeed in ‘owning’ the customer (Nooren et al., 2012). Citizen interests were being 
subordinated to those of advertisers and the digital platform operators. Growing 
demand for television, video-on-demand, and later, video steaming, created incentives 
for investment in broadband infrastructures by the network operators, stimulating the 
development of their market for a time, even if they had not yet transformed themselves 
into information processing service providers.  
 
The rise of the free and unfettered market social imaginary accompanying the 
expansion of digital services provided by information processing companies can be 
explained partly by euphoria around the fact that citizens were gaining access to the 
internet in ever greater numbers and a vast number of novel entertainment, electronic 
government and electronic commerce services was being introduced.9 Rules governing 
commercial online trading practices and data protection legislation were introduced by 
the regulatory state in an effort to protect consumer rights, but the prevailing imaginary 
was that citizens were being empowered, consistent with the generative power of civil 
society narrative. There were many critiques of this narrative at the time (Garnham, 
2000; Mosco, 2004), but, in this period, it seemed that a path dependent outcome was 
unfolding. The earlier choice to favour the end-to-end principle of the internet seemed 
to be favouring the ‘edge’ service providers and their information processing power, 
leaving the traditional network operators as ‘carriers of bits’. The prominence of the 
first set of ideas increasingly meant that state regulatory intervention was associated 
with negative effects on incentives for innovation in the digital marketplace. Digital 
platform companies operated with little transparency and the military state went 
relatively unchallenged when it engaged in electronic surveillance. 
 
The Contemporary Period 
 
Digital platform companies in the contemporary period (since the middle of the first 
decade of the 2000s) have acquired a commanding presence in the marketplace (Evans 
& Gawer, 2016; Mansell, 2015; Moore, 2016). The market for processing bits of power is 
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forecast to grow at a cumulative average annual rate of 26 per cent from 2014 to 2018 
(IDC, 2015). Some 914 million people have at least one international connection on 
social media (Facebook, Twitter, Vkontakte, Weibo) and search engines such as Google, 
Bing, Baidu and Yandex are consolidating their market share as digital platforms attract 
growing numbers of customers. By 2012 revenues from online sales and advertising for 
the 12 biggest digital platform companies reached USD 105 bn worldwide, with Google 
accounting for 45 per cent. In January 2017 Google’s share of the worldwide desktop 
market for search stood at 90 per cent, Yahoo! at 3.5 per cent, Bing at 4.0 and Baidu at 
0.3 by use, 10 but the latter Chinese provider was growing rapidly. 
 
The most prominent social imaginary, consistent with neoliberalism, is that free and 
unfettered markets yield an inclusive information processing (data analytics) 
environment which benefits citizens and consumers. This set of ideas is prevailing in 
many business and state fora, notwithstanding the fact that these companies often 
subordinate citizen interests, for example, through unfair labour contracts especially in 
areas of low income service work in the ‘on demand’ economy (van Doorn, 2017). 
Although digital platform providers sometimes call for the curtailment of bulk collection 
of personal data in a bid to preserve the public’s trust in their services (AoL et al., 2013; 
Anderson, 2016), this stance is not well-aligned with their, or their shareholders’, 
interests in commercial gain (Haggerty & Lyon, 2012; Pariser, 2011). It is unclear 
whether the contemporary period will be regarded in retrospect as yielding a path 
dependent outcome where the power of these companies and of the military state to 
access and process data is sustained.  Today, the minimum characteristic of interest is 
the algorithm and computational power for processing data. 
 
The second set of ideas underpinning the legitimacy of the regulatory state’s 
interventions to preserve a neutral conduit for the flow of information in line with the 
internet’s end-to-end principle is still in place in Western countries, despite efforts by 
some companies and by the military state to destabilize it. In the United States, for 
instance, the FCC’s order on the ‘open internet’ imposed requirements for transparency 
and anti-blocking and anti-discrimination measures on providers of internet access, 
consistent with the end-to-end principle (FCC, 2015). This order was supported by 
many civil society representatives, although it was unsuccessfully challenged in the 
court (US Court of Appeals, 2016). The European Commission’s efforts to boost the 
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European digital economy have also provided scope to embrace network neutrality ‘by 
safeguarding equal and non-discriminatory treatment of internet access services and 
related end-users’ rights’ (EC, 2015: 1), in this case, emphasising that social values are 
to be taken into account as long as regulatory state intervention does not reduce 
incentives for the growth of the digital economy.  
 
The efforts of the regulatory state in the United States and Europe in the context of 
preserving network neutrality have focused mainly on ensuring that public network 
operators’ traffic management practices do not result in unreasonable blocking or 
throttling of data. However, they also provide for specialized service offerings 
(optimized for specific content and quality of service) which enables discriminatory 
information processing under certain conditions (FCC, 2010; Sidak & Teece, 2010; 
BEREC, 2016; European Commission, 2015). This approach to defining what is expected 
of network operators requires an evidence base that is difficult to extract from 
companies which claim that their data are commercially sensitive. Thus, in practice, 
information processing power at the core of the network can be used in discriminatory 
ways. It has been argued that the non-neutral treatment of data in the Internet and 
Transport layers of the network has been happening for some time as ‘common’ or 
‘public’ carriage of data has become increasingly unattractive to Internet Access 
Providers as the principal means of generating profits (Noam, 2010; Sluijs, 2010; Wu & 
Yoo, 2007; Nooren et al., 2012). When internet service providers deviate from providing 
undifferentiated services, they can introduce ‘reasonable’ discrimination using tiers of 
service based on traffic volumes and the quality of service using the ‘intelligent’ 
software in the core of their networks to avoid congestion which is regarded a 
consistent with neutrality. The same technology (e.g. deep packet inspection), however, 
also enables these companies to give priority to preferred content and data flows which 
increases their revenues.  
 
The technologies being embedded within the internet’s ostensibly neutral layers also 
support the military state in accessing data for surveillance purposes (Bendrath & 
Mueller, 2011). The second set of ideas legitimates military state intervention which 
allows for access to data and data traces generated by citizen online interactions 
(Suarez, 2016). The military state looks to the information processing capabilities which 
are being re-introduced into the core of public networks and that are not (yet) deemed 
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to jeopardize network neutrality. Digital platform companies offering services at the 
applications layer of the internet are also being required to respond to state requests 
for access to data, albeit in Western democracies, with legal oversight. These 
developments in Europe are restrained to some extent by privacy legislation mandating 
these companies to deploy ‘do not track’ settings and to implement a ‘right to erasure’ of 
privacy intrusive information (EC, 2012, 2014). The General Data Protection Regulation 
(EC, 2016) has introduced a right to an explanation on request about how a citizen’s 
data have been used to reach a decision. The citizen’s interest still is subordinated, 
however, since the onus is on the individual to make a request for the elimination of a 
digital footprint or for an explanation. Both require a capacity to understand complex 
terms of service agreements (Helberger, 2014), and make demands on the individual’s 
time and other scarce resources. Legislative measures of this kind also do not take 
account of the fact that data processing now relies on data derivatives which can be 
reconnected with a person, notwithstanding data protection legislation (Amoore, 2011). 
Improved information processing capabilities, owned and controlled by companies 
using sophisticated algorithms, are presented by both companies and the state as an 
effective way of minimizing risks to citizens as a result of better targeting of commercial 
services and services for health care and other public services, which are then 
positioned as increasing consumer choice in the ‘data economy’ (Trottier, 2012). The 
free and unfettered markets social imaginary is robust despite the fact that algorithms 
employ computational methods which cannot, or cannot easily, be scrutinized and there 
is very little, if any, transparency and accountability for decisions based on 
interpretations of the results produced by information processing techniques at the 
edges of networks (O’Neil, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, consistent with the third set of ideas – Generative Power of Civil Society – 
in the current period, multistakeholder organizations such as the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), demonstrate that, on some occasions, the 
interests of civil society are not being subordinated to those of the military state and 
dominant companies. However temporarily, it is feasible for bottom up action to occur 
that succeeds to some extent in resisting the power that enables the dominant 
companies and the military state to exercise control over information processing 
(DeNardis, 2014; Klimburg et al., 2014). For example, a contest over the internet 
domain name system and control of the Internet’s root zone file has been resolved by a 
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change whereby ICANN, which operates as a non-profit corporation, has been given 
responsibility for Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, without the 
oversight of the United States Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA). This occurred when the contract between 
ICANN and the government expired in 2016 (GAO, 2016). The transition has been 
regarded as a success in assuring accountability and as confirming the authority of 
collaborating corporate, state and civil society participants. The process became 
politicized, however, just prior to this change when President Elect Trump and 
Republican Senator Ted Cruz opposed the transfer claiming that the government 
needed to retain its control to preserve the stability of the internet (Eggerton, 2016; 
ICANN, 2016). With the free and unfettered markets social imaginary ascending in the 
United States, this lends apparent legitimacy to the measures such as those taken by the 
current FCC Chairman who is initiating actions to recind the earlier open internet order 
(Kang, 2017). Is a path dependent outcome inevitable in the light of the choices 
favouring information processing at the edges of networks and the interests of the 
dominant digital platform operators? 
 
The generative power of civil society social imaginary is still rivaling the ‘free’ market 
set of ideas and representatives of civil society are resisting citizen subordination by 
companies and the military state in numerous ways. Some critical theorists suggest, for 
example, that a networked multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2001) can use the applications 
layer of the internet’s architecture to build applications that contest commercial and 
state power. Citizens are using information processing on the applications layer for 
mass self-communication to counter power asymmetries (Castells, 2009, 2012). The 
minimum characteristic for controlling bits of power – the algorithm and data - is 
yielding opportunities for civil society actors to provide their own interpretations of 
data. For example, individuals and dispersed crowds are using their access to, and 
occasional control of, the minimum characteristic to their advantage as in the case of 
sousveillance (Mann et al. 2003) and through the mobilization of citizens using digital 
platforms in response to crises (Asmolov, 2016). These edge information processing 
capabilities can be used to develop services to escape from state and corporate 
surveillance through anonymity which preserves privacy to some extent, as well as 
freedom of expression (Gehl, 2014). In practice, the ideal of the imaginary of generative 
power is challenged by the fact that these means for enabling citizen control of bits of 
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power can be used to uphold  fundamental citizen rights or to promote values 
associated with crime. Civil society communities also have embraced free/libre open 
software to develop services on the application layer but sometimes find that their 
collaborative values are distorted by commercial participation in open source projects 
(Birkenbine, 2015). Standards for App development on the applications layer, for 
example, in the case of the initially open Hypertext Mark-Up Language (HTML), are 
migrating to proprietary standards for web services accessed using the mobile internet. 
Rather than providing a basis for the empowerment of internet users and producers of 
Apps, commercial ‘value networks’ are being created which support the control of 
services (and data) by dominant players such as Google and Apple (Daubs & Manzerolle, 
2016).  
 
Notwithstanding these contradictory outcomes, the idealized social imaginary of civil 
society generative power persists with an expectation that dispersed online 
communities will use their means of control of the minimum characteristic of today’s 
network to achieve social justice and greater equity in society, albeit within the 
constraints of capitalism (Zittrain, 2008, 2013). Berners-Lee (2014: np) says that, ‘our 
rights are being infringed more and more on every side, … I want … to take the web 
back into our own hands …’. He refers here to the Web, but this comment is similar to 
the broader narrative which calls for measures to preserve the internet’s neutrality as 
the strategy for preserving opportunities for civil society to exercise its generative 
power in society. However, as Pickard (2017: np) observes, network neutrality is ‘really 
about a far larger power struggle over access to information and people’s rights to 
express themselves politically and creatively’ in a pervasive digitally mediated 
environment which depends on information processing power.  
 
The minimum characteristic which is important for sustaining power in the current 
period is information processing capability, now embedded in the periphery and in the 
core of the network. Retaining the end-to-end principal through network neutrality 
policies still matters, but it is the algorithmic techniques that are key to the capacity to 
control the information and communication subsystem and for interpreting vast 
quantities of data. The outcomes and consequences in the contemporary struggle over 
bits of power are uncertain because the legitimacy accorded to the concerned actors is 
in flux and the three social imaginaries arguably are changing in their configuration. It is 
for this reason that contemporary regulatory approaches that are intended to achieve 
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‘algorithmic accountability’ need to be considered (Yeung, 2017), not only in relation to 
their technical viability and their consistency with legal mores, but also in relation to 
the social imaginaries which condition whether they will be applied effectively in the 
interests of citizens. The current period may turn out to be a path dependent critical 
juncture in the sense that corporate control of information processing and the military 
state’s interventions prevail. There may, however, be an opportunity for civil society to 
exploit its control over the information processing capabilities in a way that yields 
outcomes consistent with greater justice and equity. This outcome depends on whether 
a path dependent past can be destabilized.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This analysis of the chain of subordinations during the recent history of information and 
communication networks has focused on minimum characteristics around which 
conflict has centered. It reveals potential opportunities for change that are overlooked 
when the focus is on network neutrality and the technical standards and practices in the 
middle layers of the internet. An historical analytical lens also shows how social 
imaginaries have combined and recombined at different times to legitimize state, 
corporate and civil society actions. It is sometimes assumed that the technical 
arrangement for the end-to-end flow of data is the minimum characteristic of primary 
concern because it is believed to have locked the network subsystem into a 
configuration consistent with the potential empowerment of citizens. However, the 
minimum characteristic that has mattered historically, and matters even more so now, 
is the capability for computerized information processing – the algorithm and the data it 
requires. Control of bits of power is finely balanced among the digital platform 
providers, the network operators, the military and the regulatory state and civil society 
actors. The regulatory state’s interventions to preserve an open internet to avoid 
‘discriminatory and exclusive deal making’ (Lessig & McChesney, 2006: np) focuses on 
one locus of control and, arguably, not the most critical one in the current period. Over 
time, at the level of the whole social and economic system, outcomes have been 
relatively stable insofar as choices made for control of bits of power by companies and 
the military state, moderated only to some extent by the regulatory state, have 
persistently subordinated citizen interests.  The question is whether outcomes 
associated with control over the very sophisticated algorithmic information processing 
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technologies now being embedded at the core and periphery of networks will prove to 
be path dependent. If the third set of ideas – the Generative Power of Civil Society - rises 
in prominence in the world capitalist system, the current period might prove to be a 
critical juncture where developments result in a ‘forking of the road’ and attention to 
citizen rights gains greater traction.  
 
When the principal focus is on narrow network neutrality as a technical issue of 
standards for the network and ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’ network management 
practices, this serves as ‘a cover story for modern industrialism in motion’ (Smythe, 
1985: 432). It sustains an idealized imaginary that in practice shifts attention away from 
the asymmetrical power of digital platforms and the military state. Whether we are in 
the midst of a critical juncture that will open up new possibilities cannot be known 
except in retrospect, but an historical focus on continuity and change, institutions and 
conditioning social imaginaries helps to highlight possibilities for change. On the 
applications layer, civil society has been able to use hardware and software to resist the 
excesses of the capitalist system (state and corporate) in some instances. It is possible 
for dispersed communities or individuals to source and verify digital information that 
can provide evidence of when and how subordination of citizen interests is occurring. A 
flow of evidence of information processing (and interpretation) practices (e.g. profiling 
and recommender systems) that abrogate citizen rights could be made public on a 
regular basis, though financial resources would be needed to sustain this activity (in 
contrast to occasional leaks of information). On a sufficient scale, this might yield an 
unexpected outcome such that choices of the past are disrupted and the power of 
dominant platform and network companies as well as the military state diminishes.  
 
A global institution sponsored by members of civil society with a mandate to collate and 
circulate evidence about how information processing is being used by corporate and 
military state actors could create momentum for disrupting power asymmetries 
through greater transparency. Even if algorithms themselves are not transparent, it is 
nevertheless possible to examine who translates data into action and who takes 
decisions based on the information outputs when the ‘whole assemblage’, not only the 
technical aspects, is taken into account (Kitchin, 2017; Mansell, in press) and when 
regulation through standard setting, monitoring and the use of enforcement and 
sanctions are used to achieve control over the automated computational systems that 
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are embedded in today’s networks (Yeung, 2017). Such mandates exist for other civil 
society sponsored initiatives to address global challenges such as global warming and 
migration.  The pervasive reach of digital mediation arguably warrants a similar 
approach insofar as citizens’ rights and welfare are at risk. In democracies, if the 
regulatory state and multistakeholder organizations combine their efforts to focus on 
asymmetrical information processing power and its consequences for citizens, 
legitimized by the social imaginary of the generative power of civil society and, 
potentially, also by the regulatory state’s mandate to protect the public interest, the 
development of the information and communication network might be set on a different 
pathway.  
 
The ‘kind of world that will be borne’ as a result of the continuing evolution of the 
information and communication network subsystem is crucial to the kind of society that 
emerges. Beniger argued that when an information control system scales up, there is 
the potential for societal crisis. Under contemporary capitalism, subordination of citizen 
interests may be inevitable at the world system level and it is important to acknowledge 
that technology is ‘the fruit of social systems, embodies their consciousness, values and 
policies, and tends to reproduce them’ (Smythe, 1974: 37). There may, however, be 
grounds for hope because, at the network subsystem level, the path toward the future is 
not one where technologies ‘ride roughshod over history’ (McChesney, 2013). Path 
dependent outcomes are not inevitable and as Smythe (1964: 470) also observed, ‘no 
concentration of institutional power has ever been eternal or immune to change’. There 
are ‘many actions and reactions, many changes of gear’ (Braudel, 1979/1981: 334) that 
will influence whether control over information processing experiences a ‘forking of the 
road’ and the outcomes of struggles over bits of power start to favour citizen interests 
in fairness and equity. 
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Notes 
 
                                                        
1 Network neutrality refers to ‘the financial and qualitative terms on which unaffiliated 
content and application providers … may have their content delivered by the local 
access provider or Internet Service Providers…’ (Cave & Vogelsang, 2015: 1). 
2 The Internet Protocol Suite TCP/IP supports a set of networks interconnected for a 
universal communication service with four layers: Link, Internet, Transport, and 
Application (van Schewick, 2010).  
3 See van Schewick (2010) for the flexibility available to designers in implementing the 
Internet Protocol Suite and for narrow and broad interpretations of the end-to-end 
principle.  
4 The US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was passed in 1978. 
5 The first national Data Act was introduced in Sweden in 1973. By 1995, the first 
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